In Defence of Decodification：A Discussion of the Concept and Its Consequences

Tomasz Giaro^[1]

【Abstract】Whereas the process of codification consisted in installing civil codes at the heart of continental private law systems，which begun to revolve around their codes，decodification amounts to the opposite movement of eclipsing the code from this position of privilege. However，decodification does not mean that the code becomes completely superfluous nor that it may be wholly ignored. It means only that the civil code loses its traditional central place within a continental legal system. Outside of national law the decodifying effects are with increasing frequency displayed by European law. European regulations and directives intervene to the national civil code without manifesting a necessary minimum of systematic approach and without demonstrating any care for its substantial coherence. Also the private international law of particular countries acquired the function of higher law（lex superior）which contributes to a decodification of the national code.Last not least，several pieces of European model legislation may be applied in the role of so-called optional instruments with equally decodifying effects. In summary，decodification is not a kind of illness affecting a legal system；it is rather a normal or even salutary stage of its development which makes it more elastic and ready for new transformations.

1.Decodification as a historical necessity

The phenomenon of decodification，discovered in 1979 by the Italian civil law specialist Natalino Irti，emerged very probably some decennia earlier.^[2] Decodification means in principle the movement of a legal system in a direction opposite to the movement of codification. Whereas codification consisted in installing civil codes at the heart of continental private law systems，which begun to revolve around their codes，decodification amounts，to the contrary，to the process of eclipsing the code from this position of privilege. This effect is due to numerous pieces of special legislation on the one hand，and to the direct application of the constitution on the other hand.^[3]

Special statutes of private law，dedicated to company，banking and energy law etc.，refuse to recognize the superiority of the civil code. They form rather separate statutory microsystems having different contents，principles，constructions and terminologies. As far as the constitution is concerned，already Leon Petraycki（1867-1931）affirmed that it is within the civil code that the true fundamental laws（Grundgesetze）of the country are contained.^[4] In the same sense，the French Code Civil of 1804，which protected equality，freedom and property of the citizens，could be qualified by Jean Carbonnier（1908-2003），with good reason，as ‘a true constitution of France.’^[5] Only the recent phenomenon of the direct judicial application of the constitution deprives the civil codes of their constitutional function.^[6]

Obviously，in countries that possess codified civil law，the phenomenon of decodification is frequently given a negative connotation. As a matter of fact，this phenomenon denies the very process of codification as the cardinal feature of legal systems in continental Europe and Latin America. That is why decodification is often considered as something like a defect or even an illness of the legal system. A German civil law specialist and comparative lawyer Erik Jayme assured hundred years after the German civil code（BGB）came into force that ‘the problem of decodification，known to France and Italy，has not yet emerged in Germany.’^[7] This affirmation must be considered slightly disconcerting in reference to the country where，already in 1958，the Supreme Court in the Herrenreiter-judgment（BGH 14 February 1958，BGHZ 26，349）based the legal protection of personality not on the German civil code，where in fact such a protection traditionally failed，but directly on the federal constitution of 1949.^[8]

Of course，at this particular moment of European legal history，as the Herrenreiter-judgment and the entire series of similar decisions of the German Supreme Court（Ginseng，Fernsehansagerin and Sorayacase）was released，i.e. in the 1960s，the book of Natalino Irti still remained to be written. However，I am convinced that in legal life there may exist numerous things that have not yet been christened and therefore lack a proper name. If we are not willing to engage exclusively in research of historical legal terminology，we may，or even we must，follow Ernest Gellner，Words and Things： An Examination of，and an Attack on，Linguistic Philosophy（Victor Gollancz 1959）—concentrate on things and not on words.

The violent outcry against decodification is，thank God，not the only observable reaction of the continental legal scholarship to this phenomenon which is—let me stress this obvious feature—of empirical nature. As a matter of fact，a Polish legislative commission recently designated decodification as ‘a negative phenomenon accompanying the law-making，’^[9] hence as a more or less normal or even usual occurrence. Indeed，decodification seems to be simply inevitable in legal history：sooner or later it will change with its overwhelming force every codification. Even the so-called recodification cannot help to bring us back to the paradise lost of codification.

As a matter of fact，the recodification is never—contrary to the diverging opinion of some scholars，mostly of German origin^[10]—a simple rebuttal of the decodification-thesis^[11] or a proof of a ‘renaissance of the codification idea.’^[12] A re-codified civil code will be always forced to live in a new legal environment dominated by the phenomenon of decodification as an ‘epoch-making upheaval.’^[13] In other words，recodification does not definitely abolish the consequences of decodification，being unable to ensure the ‘total recovery’ of the previous system.

On the other hand，decodification does not mean that the code becomes completely superfluous nor that it may be wholly ignored. It means only that the civil code loses its traditional central place within a legal system. However，it does not disappear；it only moves from the centre to the periphery of the system. In consequence，the code becomes less important and less frequently applied. As the object of application appear rather numerous special laws concerning banking，transport etc. on the one hand，and the constitution，which starts to be directly applied in the civil law courts on the other hand.^[14] Special laws form a number of microsystems which，even in a terminological sense，do not depend directly on the code. In this way，despite its original unity，the system becomes multicentric or pluralistic.

We have observed at the outset that as a necessary stage in the development of the continental legal model，its decodification will happen sooner or later. The decodification of French commercial law，sometimes designated more directly as decodification of the code de commerce，released in 1807，started already thirty years after its promulgation. No later than 1838 the whole third book of the commercial code of Napoleon was substituted by a separate law on insolvency and bankruptcy（loi du 28 mai 1838 sur les faillites et banqueroutes）. Since then，this important sector of commercial law remained outside the French commercial code which was ridiculed as the ‘code of shopkeepers and artisans’（code des boutiquiers et artisans）.^[15]

However，in view of many gaps，present in several prestigious civil codes despite their ideal of completeness，we may say even that at times they enter into force already decodified. Thus，the big brother of the French commercial code，the code civil of 1804，even if inspired by a distinctly agrarian society，^[16] did not contain any regulation of such characteristically rural institutions as neighbour law，joint ownership，the recovery of property from another's possession（rei vindicatio）and possessory remedies. Moreover，the French code civil dealt with the problem of tort liability in five short articles（art. 1382-386）and completely failed to regulate the juristic persons，discriminated as intermediate bodies（corps intermé-diaires）between the State and the individual.^[17]

Likewise，the German civil code of 1900（BGB），even if in principle somewhat more detailed，dedicated only a mere twenty paragraphs（§§ 611-30 BGB）to such a novel and highly controversial legal discipline as labour law，it touched upon the concept of fault in the formation of a contract（culpa in contrahendo）very superficially，it completely overlooked the so-called positive malperformance of obligations（positive Vertragsverletzung）and the frustration of contracts（Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage）.^[18] According to the eminent German civil law specialist Gustav Boehmer（1881-1969），this should not have happened in respect to a statute which was so vast that ‘it consumed almost a quarter century of work and a huge expenditure of scholarly apparatus.’^[19]

On the other hand，the Polish Legislative Council（Rada Legislacyjna）recently extended the concept of decodification to a situation when，during the codifying process，the drafters themselves deliberately omit the regulation of certain matters，leaving them intentionally outside the scope of the code.^[20] Obviously，the concept of decodification is not formal-logical，but only typological in nature，which means that there are legal systems，branches of law and statutes which are decodified to a higher or lower degree. Decodification results not only from the inevitable aging of codes，but also from the degree of polycentrism and fragmentation of the system，i.e. from features that are also present in those countries where codes are quite new or recently remade.

The clearest case of a civil code which was ‘deeply decodified’^[21] already at the moment of its promulgation is the Polish civil code of 1964. The code itself excluded namely its own application to civil law relationships within the socialized economy（art. 2 of the Polish civil code），i.e. to relations between state enterprises，cooperatives and similar units. It was，to resort to a contemporary term，a pure code of consumer law，whereas the novel regulations，concerning the main branches of socialized economy，were left completely outside the scope of the code.^[22] The same regards family law and labour law，the former codified separately already in 1965，and the latter only in 1974.

2.Practical effects of decodification

The process of decodification abolishes at least partially the features of the codified legal system which have been considered as pivotal so far. These features of traditional civil law prove in the end to be merely myths or slogans，invented to prepare and accompany the initial stages of the codification process. Such myths are in the first place lawyers’ convictions that their legal system，in particular the system of private law，is a coherent body of imperatives centralized and self-sufficient in the framework of each nation-state. However，the post-positivist age of decodification has abandoned the narrow-minded thinking in paragraphs（Paragraphenjurisprudenz），adopting rather a wider art of juristic methodology，focused on the category of tradition.^[23]

As a tool of juristic thinking，legal tradition is obviously much more elastic than legal system. In this context，the existence or absence of certain prescriptions does not prove much. Articles 180-81 of the 1964 Polish civil code speak about the abandonment and occupation of things，but these prescriptions do not allow one to reconstruct the legal regime of such contemporarily important concepts as ‘garbage’ or ‘waste.’^[24] Conversely，the German BGB，following Roman law too closely，did not afford any protection of human personality，which was increasingly perceived as a gap. Eventually，the German Supreme Court（BGH）based its Herrenreiterurteil and similar contra legem judgments of the 1960s directly on the constitutional principle of human dignity（Menschenwürde）and the duty to grant legal protection（Rechtsgewährung）.^[25]

The second myth of the codification ideology reduced all law to the unity of the code：^[26] ‘Whatever is not in the code of laws，ought not to be law’—Jeremy Bentham（17481832）programmatically stated. In the same spirit the first European code，the Universal Territorial Law for the Prussian States（Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preussischen Staaten）of 1794，forbade judges from taking into account ‘opinions of law teachers and older judicial sentences’（ALR，Einleitung § 6）.^[27] However，the necessity of this operation also revealed itself in the case law of continental systems，namely at least in view of the inevitable vagueness of statutory language. For this reason，the codification was supplanted by decodification and the two weaker sources of law started to grow：legal doctrine and judge-made law，sometimes defined as sources of second grade.

In those continental countries which rejected the plans of codification，judicial case law played an active role as early as during the 19^th century. The best example is Russia，where the legal practice of the St. Petersburg Ruling Senate notably modernized the backwards private law of the Russian countryside. Following the abolition of serfdom and the judicial reform，from the early-mid 1860s，the Cassation Department of this highest imperial court promoted the free sale of peasant’s land and the freedom of testation.^[28] This Russian judge-made law was heavily influenced by German Pandect-science which in its turn relied on Roman law. Such institutions of Russian private law as property，acquisitive prescription，pre-emption，limitation of claims，possession，pledge and auctions also became Romanized.^[29]

The third myth of the codification ideology was lawyers’ conviction that the legislative regulations contained in the civil codes were products of abstract juristic reason，revealed as ‘written reason’（ratio scripta）already in that ‘book of wisdom’ which was Justinian's compilation. Therefore，such regulations were to elaborate exclusively with the help of rational legal doctrine alone. This doctrine，called also legal dogmatics，was expected to remain independent from historical vicissitudes，hence from historical experience and from legal history. However，this apparently necessary separation between legal dogmatics and legal history also revealed itself to be nothing more than an error of the codification era.

As a matter of fact，it seemed at first sight that the freshly released national civil codes could have been regarded as direct successors and national versions of the Justinianic ratio scripta—something as a juristic Bible or a legal revelation itself. However，it appeared very soon that the prescriptions of the civil codes did not contain abstractions and geometrical figures，which were the guiding stars of De iure belli ac pacis（Prolegomena § 58）by Hugo Grotius（1583-1654）.^[30] Alas，the law books were not written in the language of mathematics.Hence，the codes contained only simple attempts to find a legal solution to particular social problems of civil law existing in a given time and place—‘the unequal law for all.’^[31]

It was the differentiation of modern society which required the growth of special statutes of private law forming particular statutory microsystems. These solutions imply the modern concept of the ‘social model of the code，’^[32] which is today defined roughly by the type of the average addressee of its prescriptions. One of the first lawyers who drew attention to this topic of legal method was the Polish scholar Leo von Petraycki（1867-1931）. Analysing the broad right of unilateral rescission（Rücktritt）of the contract in the second draft of the German civil code BGB，Petraycki stressed that this legal institution may function well in numerous contexts，but it will be particularly harmful for small producers，especially for craftsmanship and handwork.^[33]

Hence，the modern approach to civil law as a set of solutions to particular social problems was born already in reference to the private law of the 19^th century. Whereas the French code civil of 1804，praised usually as the real constitution of France，was founded on the principle of the equality of all citizens as abstract subjects of laws and obligations（art. 8 code civil），the present regulation of this question in several civil codes of Europe，for example the German（§ 13 BGB）or Polish（art. 22¹ of the Polish civil code），is differentiated according to the circumstance whether the subject acted in the dealing as private person（consumer）or as an entrepreneur（producer，trader）.^[34]

The existence of so-called consumer contracts with their broad possibilities to cancel goods and services，to return faulty goods etc. is an example of private law strongly adapted to a particular type of addressee. The EU-legislation on abusive clauses interferes with，or even infringes on，the traditional principle of contractual stability.^[35] This deprives the modern civil law of its previous nimbus as a monument to abstract justice. The famous British comparative jurist and historian Henry Sumner Maine（1822-1888），who discovered the passage from the ‘stationary’ feudal law and society to the ‘progressive’ modern law and society in the movement from status to contract，^[36] should have described the present situation as an opposite movement from contract to status.^[37] The code，which was traditionally drafted as a monument to abstract justice，in the age of decodification must be adapted to the needs of particular socio-economic groups.

3.Decodification in transnational contexts

The aforementioned problems apply to civil codes operating within national legal systems. However，there are further difficulties generated by the coexistence of various systems outside the national framework. Think in the first place of the regulation of substantial parts of national codifications by international treaties or by the legislation of the European Union. Both are considered as regulations having a higher status（lex superior）which enjoy the privilege of preference in respect to other sources of law.As law possessing a higher status，they intervene without displaying a necessary minimum of systematic approach to the national code and without demonstrating any care for its substantial coherence.^[38]

This blame refers first of all to the so-called European regulations which are binding in toto and are directly applicable in all member states of the European Union. In this way，Regulation No. 261/2004 EC of the European Parliament and the Council，released on 11 February 2004，established rules on compensation and assistance to air passengers in case of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of their flights. In consequence，the whole legal regulation of the contract of carriage contained in the Polish civil code（art. 774-93），or in any other civil code，including carriage by rail，^[39] was deprived of practical significance.

Conversely，European directives are binding only as far as their result is concerned，whereas the forms and means of their implementation are left free to the Union's member states. Timeshare，or so-called vacation ownership，^[40] was for the first time regulated by Directive 94/47/EC which left its traces only in the form of the pure blanket provision of art. 270¹ of the Polish civil code. Eventually，the new directive 2008/122/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare，long-term holiday products，resale and exchange contracts，released on 14 January 2009，was implemented by a separate Polish Act of 16 September 2011 on Timeshare，which repealed art. 270¹ of the civil code.

Leaving aside the decodifying effects of European regulations and directives，think in the second place about the role of private international law which，in the framework of national legal system，was originally intended to be something like a meta-code. As a matter of fact，its primary function was to decide in which cases the national civil code，and in which others the foreign civil law was to be applied.^[41] In this context private international law acquired the function of higher law（lex superior）which contributed to a decodification of the national civil code. However，private international law itself also appears as an object of decodification provoked by international conventions and by the legislation of the European Union.

Think in the third place about the possible application of several pieces of European model legislation with the function of so-called optional instrument.^[42] If we may classify Roman law during the age preceding national codification as something comparable to contemporary phenomena，we must compare it to an optional instrument. As a matter of fact，Justinian's compilation（Corpus Iuris Civilis）was never a code in the full modern sense of the word not only because it principally lacked a systematic approach and contained numerous gaps，but also because its binding force in various European regions differed substantially，and finally，because Corpus Iuris was never in effect in an absolute and categorical manner.^[43]

However，with the aim of unifying European law as the ultimate objective in mind，the first preliminary step must be nothing else than the decodification of particular national systems which will deprive them of their specific characteristics. So，paradoxically，only the decodification of particular national codes in their present shape will allow formation of a single and coherent European private law in the future. Summing up，we are entitled to reconfirm once again：decodification is not a defect or a kind of illness affecting a legal system；it is rather a normal or even salutary stage of its development which makes it more elastic and ready for new transformations.

Furthermore，decodification is not a failure of one particular civil code，such as the Romanian，German or Polish codes，that for one reason or another revealed themselves to be defective. Even if somebody speaks in a restrained way of the decodification of a code，^[44] or of décodification d'un code，^[45] the failure concerns rather the whole model of the legal system with a civil code placed in its centre and the constitution crowning above it. Hence，it is，first of all，a failure of ‘codification mentality，’^[46] since decodification need not affect the text of the code. As a matter of fact，the text may remain completely unchanged and nonetheless—facing numerous special statutes—be downscaled to the role of a piece of symbolic legislation which lacks much significance for the living law of the country.

And to the contrary：the obvious fact that nowadays in various parts of the civil law world new codes are frequently being made and old codes remade，is not a decisive or not even a particularly efficient argument against the necessary recognition that we are living in an era of decodification. Even if this conclusion is resisted by such an impressive comparative lawyer as Rodolfo Sacco，^[47] it still remains undeniable that those codes which are newly made or remade will necessarily exist in the surroundings of decodification，composed of special legislative microsystems and with a constitution as the paramount source of civil law.

Moreover，codification and decodification are not merely contradictory concepts associated with the qualification of unity and harmony on the one hand，as opposed to fragmentation and chaos on the other hand. They are，rather，two different models of functioning of any modern legal system. The former is born in rural society as a static，formally closed system and the latter is adapted to a dynamic，open service society. In this sense decodification expresses a contemporary trend towards a pluralistic or polycentric system which enables legal staff to flexibly regulate and resolve emerging contrasts and problems.^[48] At the end of the day，decodification facilitates convergence and globalization.

A glance at the contemporary international panorama reveals that，whereas the significance of legislation in the common law grows，the same is true of the role of judge-made law on the continent.^[49] Among the reasons for this，several analysts remember the diffusion of constitutional review：in Western Europe immediately after the World War II and in Eastern Europe after the historical transformations of 1989-1990.^[50] Some constitutional courts are constitutionally empowered to adjudicate with the force of law：the 1949 German constitution provides this explicitly（art. 92 § 2）and the 1997 Polish constitution at least implicitly （art. 190 § 1）.^[51]

Finally，the emergence of European Union's special legal order should not be forgotten，which reminds us of the type of mixed legal systems. These systems，which were once rarities of juristic taxonomy，have now become the rule. However，European Union is first of all a transnational legal area. Even inside such an area，legal collisions between partial subsystems may be resolved only by courts，namely first of all by national courts. Sometimes even a decision contra legem（but intra ius！）is necessary，as in the classical German case，where-despite the silence of the civil code BGB—the right of personality was deduced from the constitutional principle of human dignity（Menschenwürde）as well as from the principle of duty to grant legal protection（Rechtsgew hrung）.^[52]

为去法典化辩护：有关去法典化的概念及其结果的讨论

托马兹·奇亚罗

【摘要】法典化是一个将民法典置于欧洲大陆私法中心，使各私法系统围绕其法典运作的过程。而去法典化则是一个相反的过程，即削弱民法典在法律系统中的重要地位。但是去法典化并不意味着法典已成为多余，或者可以被完全忽视，而只是意味着民法典已失去其在大陆法系统中传统的中心地位。在国内法之外，去法典化的效应也在欧洲法中日益显示了出来。欧洲法规和指令在既没有在方法上显示出必要的最低限度的系统性，也没有对民法典的实质一致性显示出任何关心的情况下对成员国的民法典进行干预。另外具体国家的国际私法获得了高级法（lex superior）的功能，从而进一步促进了国内法典的去法典化。最后，欧洲一些示范立法可以被作为同样具有去法典化作用的所谓的选择性文书加以适用。总而言之，去法典化并非影响法律制度的一种弊病，而是法律制度发展的一个正常的甚至是有益的阶段，因为它使法律制度更具柔韧性，为其新的转型创造条件。

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[1]Dean of the Faculty of Law and Administration of the University of Warsaw，Professor of Roman Law and European Legal History and Editor-in-Chief of the Studia Iuridica Journal.

[2]Leone Niglia， The Struggle for European Private Law， A Critique of Codification（Hart Publishing 2017）54.

[3]Natalino Irti，‘Leggi speciali（dal mono-sistema al poli-sistema）’（1979）25 Rivista del Diritto Civile 1，141.

[4]Leon Petraycki，Die Lehre vom Einkommen（H.W. Müller 1895）vol 2，470；cf Tomasz Giaro，‘La Civilpolitik di Petraycki’（1995）23 Index 106.

[5]Jean Carbonnier，Droit civil， Introduction（20th edn，PUF 1991）123；Rémy Cabrillac，‘Le Code civil est-il la véritable constitution de la France？’（2005）39 Themis 245-59.

[6]John H Merryman and Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo，The Civil Law Tradition：An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Europe and Latin America（3rd edn，Stanford University Press 2007）152-54.

[7]Erik Jayme，‘Die Bedeutung des Allgemeinen Teils im System des BGB’ in I cento anni del codice civile tedesco（Cedam 2002）818；cf Benjamin Herzog，Anwendung und Auslegung von Recht in Portugal und Brasilien（Mohr Siebeck 2014）654.

[8]Thomas Raiser，‘Richterrecht heute’ in Norbert Achterberg（ed），Rechtsprechungslehre （Carl Heymanns 1986）627-28；Tomasz Giaro，‘Rechtsanwendung，Rechtsfortbildung und römische Rechtsgeschichte’ in Ricerche dedicate al prof. Filippo Gallo（Jovene 1997）vol. 3，503-504.

[9]Kamil Stolarski，‘Antykruchos＇c＇ a obawy przed s＇wiatem po dekodyfikacji’ [‘Antifragile and the Fear of the World after the Decodification’] in Franciszek Longchamps de Bérier（ed），Dekodyfikacja prawa prywatnego [Decodification of Private Law：A Sketch to its Portrait] （Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 2017）249.

[10]Except Jan P Schmidt，‘Kodifikation’ in Handwörterbuch des europäischen Privatrechts（Mohr Siebeck 2009）vol 2，989；id，Zivilrechtskodifikation in Brasilien（Mohr Siebeck 2009）146.

[11]Thomas Duve，‘Verbraucherschutzrecht und Kodifikationsgedanke’（2002）12 IURA 797.

[12]Matthias Reimann，‘Die Erosion der klassischen Formen’（2006）28 Zeitschrift für Neuere Rechtsgeschichte 216 fn 28.

[13]Susanne Genner，Dekodifikation（Helbing ＆ Lichtenhahn 2006）200.

[14]Mateusz J. Nocuń，‘Konstytucjonalizacja prywatnych praw podmiotowych’ [‘Constitutionalization of Private Subjective Rights’]（2015）61 Studia Iuridica 251-82.

[15]Bruno Oppetit，‘La décodifcation du droit commercial français’ in Études offertes à René Rodière（Dalloz 1981）197-207；Anna Klimaszewska，Code de commerce （Arche 2011）71，77.

[16]Jacques Bouineau，‘The Nineteenth Century：The Golden Age of the Civil Code’ ＜www. cultures-france.com/adpf-publi/folio/textes/codecivil_en.pdf＞ accessed 3 April 2018.

[17]Rodolfo Sacco，Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung（Nomos 2001）213-14；Antonio Gambaro and Rodolfo Sacco，Sistemi giuridici comparati （3rd edn，UTET 2009）225-27.

[18]Schmidt（n 9）146；Tomasz Giaro，‘Culpa in contrahendo’ in Ulrich Falk and Heinz Mohnhaupt（eds）， Das Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch und seine Richter（Klostermann 2000）125.

[19]Gustav Boehmer，Einführung in das bürgerliche Recht（2nd edn，Mohr Siebeck 1965）80，267.

[20]Zbigniew Radwański（ed），Zielona Księga. Optymalna wizja Kodeksu cywilnego w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej[The Green Book.The Optimal Vision of a Civil Code in the Polish Republic]（Oficyna Wydawnicza MS 2006）27.

[21]Fryderyk Zoll，‘Problem struktury przyszɫego polskiego kodeksu cywilnego’ [‘The Problem of Structure of the Future Polish Civil Code’] in Mirosɫaw Kosek and Jerzy Sɫyk（eds），W trosce o rodzinę. Księga pamiᶏtkowa prof. Wandy Stojanowskiej [Out of Concern for the Family. Studies in Honour of Prof. Wanda Stojanowska]（C H Beck 2008）648.

[22]Jan Rudnicki，‘Dekodyfikacja prawa cywilnego doby PRL’ [‘The Decodification of the Civil Law in the Age of the Polish People's Republic’] in Tomasz Giaro（ed），z＇ródɫa prawa. Teoria i praktyka [Sources of Law. Theory and Practice] （Wolters Kluwer 2016）75-89.

[23]Tomasz Giaro，‘Modernisierung durch Transfer-Schwund osteuropäischer Rechtstraditionen’ in Tomasz Giaro（ed），Modernisierung durch Transfer im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert （Klostermann 2006）275-81；Nocuń（n 13）262.

[24]Jan Rudnicki，‘Gdzie szukac＇ rzeczy niczyich，czyli do czego sɫuy kodeks cywilny’ [‘Where to Find Ownerless Things or What the Civil Code is for？’]（2014）25 Forum Prawnicze 24-27.

[25]Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz，An Introduction to Comparative Law（Tony Weir tr，3rd edn，Oxford University Press 1998）690-93.

[26]Jeremy Bentham，‘General View of a Complete Code of Laws’ in The Works of J Bentham（William Tait 1839）vol 3，205；cf JM Smits，‘Of the Vocation of our Age Against Codifcation’ in JM Milo，JHA Lokin and JM Smits（eds），Tradition，Codifcation and Unifcation （Intersentia 2014）246-47.

[27]Paul Koschaker，Europa und das römische Recht （4th edn，CH Beck 1966）183-84.

[28]William E Butler，‘The Role of Case-Law in the Russian Legal System’ in John H Baker（ed），Judicial Records，Law Reports and the Growth of Case Law （Duncker ＆ Humblot 1989）337-52；Gareth Popkins，‘Russian Peasant Wills in the Decisions of the Ruling Senate’， The Journal of Legal History，（1999）20，1-23.

[29]Martin Avenarius，Fremde Traditionen des römischen Rechts. Einfluss，Wahrnehmung und Argument des ‘rimskoe pravo’im russischen Zarenreich des 19. Jahrhunderts （Wallstein 2014）483.

[30]Dieter von Stephanitz，Exakte Wissenschaft und Recht. Der Einfluss von Naturwissenschaft und Mathematik auf Rechtsdenken（Walter de Gruyter 1970）53.

[31]Pio Caroni，‘Ungleiches Recht für alle’ in Festschrift für Richard Bäumlin（Rüegger 1992）107-33.

[32]Franz Wieacker，Das Sozialmodell der klassischen Privatrechtsgesetzbücher und die Entwicklung der modernen Gesellschaft （CF Müller 1953）.

[33]Petraycki（n 3）523-24；Giaro（n 3）109，121，124，131.

[34]Dieter Medicus，‘Schützbedürfnisse（insbesondere Verbraucherschutz）und das Privatrecht’（1996）36 Juristische Schulung 761-67.

[35]Michaɫ Romanowski，‘ycie umowy konsumenckiej po uznaniu jej postanowienia za nieuczciwe’ [‘The Life of a Consumer Contract after Having Recognized its Clauses as Abusive’] in Michaɫ Romanowski（ed），ycie umowy konsumenckiej po uznaniu jej postanowienia za nieuczciwe [The Life of a Consumer Contract after Having Recognized its Clauses as Abusive] （CH Beck 2017）42-3.

[36]Henry Sumner Maine，Ancient Law（JM Dent ＆ Sons 1917）100.

[37]Pio Caroni，Saggi sulla storia della codificazione（Giuffrè 1998）95.

[38]Jan Rudnicki，‘Remarks Regarding the Influence of European Legislation upon the Codification of Civil Law’（2017）71 Studia Juridica 207-17.

[39]Grzegorz Blicharz，‘Samolotem lub pociᶏgiem-dekodyfikacja umowy przewozu’ [‘By Plane or by Rail-Decodification of the Transport Contract’] in Longchamps（n 8）107-10.

[40]Katarzyna Ludwichowska，‘Dyrektywy UE o timesharingu a koniecznos＇z＇ reformy prawa polskiego’ [‘EU Timesharing Directives and the Necessity of Polish Law Reform’]（2010）65 Państwo i Prawo 4，65；Tomasz Janczak，‘Prawny charakter timeshare’ingu i jego geneza w polskim systemie prawnym’ [‘The Legal Nature of Timesharing and its Origin in the Polish Legal System’]（2016）2 Kwartalnik Prawo-Spoɫeczeństwo-Ekonomia 40-50.

[41]Mateusz J Nocuń，‘Polskie prawo prywatne międzynarodowe a dekodyfikacja’ [‘Polish International Private Law and Decodification’] in Longchamps（n 8）146-48.

[42]Bartɫomiej Woz＇niak，‘Instrument opcjonalny-harmonizacja przez dekodyfikację’ [‘Optional Instrument-Harmonization through Decodification’]in Longchamps（n 8）213-14.

[43]Tomasz Giaro，‘Czy w przewidywalnej przyszɫos＇ci powstanie europejskie prawo zobowiᶏzań？’ [‘Can the European Law of Obligations be Expected in a Foreseeable Future’]（2010）1 Forum Prawnicze 88；Stolarski（n 8）262-63.

[44]Christina Deliyanni-Dimitrakou，‘The Greek Civil Code Facing the Process of Decodifcation’，in Julio C.Rivera（ed），The Scope and Structure of Civil Codes （Springer 2013）201-32；Hiroyasu Ishikawa，‘Codifcation，Decodifcation and Recodifcation of the Japanese Civil Code’ ibid 267-85.

[45]Emmanuel Dockès，‘La décodification du code du travail’（2007）4 Droit Social 931.

[46]David B Goldman， Globalisation and the Western Legal Tradition（Cambridge University Press 2007）185-86，190-92，194-95.

[47]Rodolfo Sacco，‘Codifcare：un modo superato di legiferare？’（1983）29 Rivista di Diritto Civile 1，117-35.

[48]Genner（n 12）208.

[49]Reimann（n 11）216-18.

[50]Wojciech Sadurski，Rights before Courts. A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central and Eastern Europe（Springer 2005）.

[51]Tomasz Giaro，‘Paradoks suwerennos＇ci i zjawiska pokrewne’ [‘The Sovereignty Paradox and Related Phaenomena’] in Jan Majchrowski（ed），W obronie suwerennos＇ci [‘In Defence of Sovereignty’]（Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 2017）27.

[52]Jörn Ipsen，‘Rechtsprechung im Grenzbereich zur Gesetzgebung’ in Norbert Achterberg（ed），Rechtsprechungslehre（Carl Heymanns Verlag 1986）440-441；Raimund Wimmer，‘Der Richter als Notgesetzgeber’ in Der Richter und 40 Jahre Grundgesetz（CF Müller 1991）43-44.