2 The Security Strategy of a Successful Rise

According to MRT, the essence of the security strategy for a successful rise is to be flexible and evolve with changes, rather than to follow a fixed doctrine. Every rising state faces particular strategic security threats. The probability of a successful rise can only be increased by the timely adjustment of strategy based on changing security threats. Failed rises usually have similar causes, but successful rises do not follow the same strategy. Even during the process of one successful rise, security strategies differ in different stages.

2.1 It Is Necessary to Adjust Strategic Goals in Different Stages According to Changes in Status of National Strength

It takes three strategic stages for a major country to rise: preparation, taking-off and surpassing. Therefore, rising states should adjust their specific strategic goals according to the changes in their own status of national strength. The world economic crisis in 2008 led to a relative decline in the strength of the US and other major Western countries, while China's strength ascended to 2ndin the world after 2010. During the Neighborhood Diplomacy Work Conference in 2013, the goal of China's foreign policy strategy was modified from “a peaceful environment for economic growth” to“a favorable surrounding environment for national rejuvenation”. In this meeting, it was proposed that, “doing well in neighborhood diplomacy is necessary for China to achieve the Two Centenary Goals and realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. We should promote neighborhood diplomacy to win a sound neighboring environment for China's development, which will also benefit neighboring countries to achieve common development”. This newly established goal is in compliance with the fact that China's comprehensive national strength has risen to 2ndplace in the world. Because of the adjustment of strategic goals, there was corresponding adjustment in the strategy to achieve these goals, from “keeping a low profile” to “striving for achievement”.

The strategic principle of striving for achievement is built upon the foundation that China has become the second largest power in the world. Therefore, each specific strategic goal of this strategy should match this foundation. This means that China's policies should not exceed the capacity of the 2ndlargest power in the world, and that policies should not be made as if it is the largest power in the world. Specifically speaking, it means that the strategic actions of the US cannot be used as the standard for China's strategies. The strategic principle of striving for achievement means that China should shoulder its international responsibility by providing international public goods, but no more than that provided by the US. In the case of greenhouse gas emission reduction under global governance, China should provide less aid than the US for global CO2emission reduction. If the policies of China are made according to the standard of US policies, the inadequacy in capabilities will lead to weakened national strength and strategic deficit for China. MRT believes that making policies beyond the capacity of national strength is not striving for achievement, but vanity. As the comprehensive national strength of a country is constantly changing, MRT believes that a rising state needs to adjust its foreign strategy in a timely manner, according to the changes in its status of national strength.

China, now ranking second in the world in comprehensive national strength, is only a qualitative judgement rather than a quantitative one. It is also necessary to accurately assess the exact capacity of China's national strength. That is, to find out the level of China's comprehensive national strength in comparison with that of the US. A more rational goal of China's foreign policy can only be stipulated when we figure out the difference between the national strength of China and that of the US. My assessment on this matter is that China's comprehensive national strength is currently equivalent to 50%-60% of that of the US. This tells us that, even if the strategy of striving for achievement is implemented, the overall goal of China's foreign strategy should not exceed 2/3 of that of the US. Following the standard requirements of the United Nations, the developing countries should devote 0.7% of their GDP to aid developing countries. Undoubtedly, most developing countries have failed to meet this requirement, including the US. Under this UN standard, the outbound aid of China should not exceed 0.45% of GDP, as it is a developing country with comprehensive national strength less than 2/3 of that of the US. However, in 2015, China made commitments to provide US$60 billion to Africa , US$46 billion to Pakistan , approximately US$3.1 billion to the South-South Cooperation Fund on Climate Change , US$2 billion to the South-South Cooperation Fund . In addition, China exempted some developing countries from intergovernmental interest-free loan debts that were due in 2015 and still unreturned. These items added up to 1.1% of China's USD$10 trillion GDP in 2015, higher even than the UN required standard of developed countries.

Another element to consider when making foreign policy strategies is the gap between states in different sectors. Between China and the US, the economic gap is relatively small, however, the gap crescendos through the political and military spheres. According to MRT, the power element is non-convertible. National strength in one particular sector can hardly be converted directly to address problems in another sector. For instance, despite the economic aid it has provided, Japan has failed to receive support from most developing countries for its political plan to reform the system of permanent members of the UN Security Council. Therefore, MRT argues that strategies concerning a specific sector should be made based on China's national strength in this sector only. When the strategy is made within the scale of its strength, the goal of a rising state has stronger support, less risk being of aborted and a greater certainty of success. Consequently, the cause of a rising China will be safeguarded. Otherwise, it might face setbacks. North Korea is a case in point: it is beyond the capability of either China or the US to denuclearize North Korea; therefore the nuclear projects in North Korea have not been terminated. The denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is probably the most politically correct slogan. But if we deem it as a short-term strategic goal of China, then even with twice the efforts, we would have only half the results.

2.2 A Strategy of Expansion Should Match the Moral Principles of the Era

According to MRT, if the security strategy of the rising power matches the particular moral principles of a specific era, it would help the rising power to reduce external fear and opposition, and to establish a safe, favorable environment for its rise. No country would wish, or support, another country to grow stronger, unless they can benefit from that growth. China is not alone in lacking supporters for its rise. Historically, it has happened to every other major rising power. When lacking supporters, the major strategic concern is how to reduce opposition from other states. MRT believes that the key factor for reducing international opposition is to ensure that the foreign policy strategy is in compliance with the moral principles of the era as much as possible.

International morality is relative and standards of morality fluctuate throughout the ages. When in the same era, the question becomes: which state's foreign policy exhibits a higher moral standard? For the rising state, the international community assesses the standard of its morality according to that of hegemonic countries. That is to say, for a rising state in a particular era, as long as its standard of morality is slightly above that of the hegemonic state, it will be regarded as a moral state; on the contrary, if its moral standard is slightly lower, it will be regarded as immoral. At present, the international community takes the US as the reference for China. No country in the world wishes for either China or the US to become a superpower, yet this is beyond their control. It is a security challenge for small and medium-sized countries, regardless of which country dominates. They can only choose according to which hegemony would benefit them the most. That is to say, they can only “choose the lesser of the two evils”. Therefore, MRT argues that, as long as the moral standard of China's foreign policy strategy is higher than that of the US, it can effectively reduce the fear and opposition from the international community regarding the rise of China, and even win greater support from the rest of the world.

Throughout the history of China, there are various cases of successful rises, through being slightly higher in moral standard than the hegemon. For instance, although the Shang and Zhou Dynasties both made their feudatory countries submissive, King Zhou of Shang mistreated his courtiers and feudatory countries, while King Wu of Zhou did not. Consequently, it was said that 800 small countries betrayed King Zhou of Shang to join King Wu of Zhou, as they regarded King Zhou of Shang as an immoral despot and King Wu of Zhou as a sage king. In the Western Han dynasty, the Han fought the Huns to conquer countries in western China. They were both expanding, but the Han dynasty was making a political expansion and seeking feudatory relations with countries in western China, while the Huns were engaging in a resource expansion, seeking subordination and exploiting the resources and labor of those countries. In every era, there is no absolute standard to judge whether a major power is moral or immoral. In the Cold War era, the US was considered to be more moral than the USSR. One important criterion was that the US invaded opposing countries, but not its own allies, while the USSR invaded both opposing countries and its own allies. In the 1950's and 1960's, the USSR sent troops to invade Hungary and Czechoslovak, two of its allies who shared the same ideology with USSR.

Some might argue that China's strategy of peaceful rise can win international support. Nevertheless, the “China threat” theory has been articulated consistently since the end of the Cold War. According to MRT, whether one fights wars is not the criterion the international community uses to determine morality. Instead, they are concerned about whose strategy brings more benefit to them, particularly strategic benefits. If the country fighting a war brings more benefits than the country not fighting a war, the international community considers the country in war as moral and the other as immoral. Before WWII, the Chamberlain administration of Great Britain adopted the policy of appeasement towards the policy of expansion of Nazi Germany to avoid war, which was considered as immoral. Morality, in the sense of international politics, refers to the justness of the policy and action of a country, not the refrainment from armed force.

The principle of beneficence asserts that small and medium-sized countries consider major powers that bring more security benefits to be moral ones. The principle of nonmaleficence asserts that they would consider a major power that brings less damage to their strategic interests to be moral as well. For instance, in the Cold War era, European countries disliked the US and the USSR. Yet, as they were more worried about the foreign policy of the USSR, they would rather give away some sovereign rights and allow US troops to establish military bases on their territory. Currently, a large number of Asia-Pacific countries adopt double-track strategies that work in opposite directions. They depend on China's economy, but turn to the US for security. Such strategies show that these Asia-Pacific countries believe that they can gain economic benefits from China and security benefits from the US. It also shows that they believe they are facing a greater security “threat” from China's strategy than from the US's. They also consider China as a major power unwilling to shoulder international security responsibilities, as China does not provide security guarantee for small and medium sized countries; on the contrary, the US is willing to take responsibility for protecting other countries. This explains why the opinion of “China threat” is much more widespread than that of “US threat” in the Asia-Pacific region, even though the US has been constantly starting wars while China has never participated in any war since the end of the Cold War. From the perspective of MRT, China's nonalignment principle prevents China from making commitments to protect other countries, resulting in an image of moral inferiority to the US in the area of security.

2.3 Smaller International Resistance to Expansion in Emerging Areas

The rise of a major power means conflicts in interests with other countries. Therefore, it is critical to expand one's own interests while reducing conflicts with others. According to MRT, the priority of security strategy of a rising state is to reduce international opposition and win international support. To have one less opponent is much easier than to have one more supporter. If China cannot reduce the number of opponents, then winning support for its rise is highly unlikely.

At present, there are 193 member countries in the United Nations and over 200 political entities. The expansion of a rising state will encounter smaller resistance when it is in conflict with only the minority of countries instead of the majority of countries. Conflicts of interests with a few countries are generally not considered to be moral problems, whereas conflicts of interests with a majority of countries would most likely be considered immoral by the international community. Therefore, the policies of interest expansion should target areas that would cause conflicts of interests with few, or the minority of, countries, rather than areas that might trigger widespread anger. In this way, it is possible to win over a “non-opposition” attitude from most countries in the international community, and to build upon that to make other states reach for their support. That is to say, to choose the rising state over the hegemon.

For instance, when China did not manufacture big commercial airplanes, there were no conflicts of interest between China, and Boeing from the US as well as Airbus from Europe. In the future, when the C919 from China rolls out of the final assembly line and starts to be produced in large quantities, there will surely be conflicts of interests between China and Boeing or Airbus. This might lead to a three-party competition among the “ABC”: Airbus, Boeing and Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC). But in areas such as commercial airliners, there are only two major companies, Airbus and Boeing. When China expands its interests in this field, it will not cause conflicts of interest with the majority of countries that do not produce big commercial airplanes. Therefore, opposition from most countries can be avoided. Generally speaking, expanding interests in emerging areas encounters less resistance than in traditional areas, and it is even possible to win the support of most members of the international community. This is because in emerging areas, generally only a few major countries with stronger capabilities have the same interests, while the majority of countries have no strategic interest. If a rising state wishes to expand interests in emerging areas, it does not constitute threat or damage to countries that have no such interests. Take the market for big commercial airplanes as the case. Apart from the US and Europe, the interests of China and other buyers of the planes are complimentary rather than conflicting. Therefore, it is possible to win their support.

Historically, the competition for expanding interests in emerging areas, rather than traditional ones, has been less intense for rising powers. While major European countries were all expanding and exploiting the European continent, Spain and Portugal took to the road less traveled. They went and colonized in South America, evolving into two colonial empires earlier far earlier than other European powers. At the end of 19thcentury, when the European countries were expanding their concessions in China, the US, being the latecomer, implemented the “open door” trade expansion policy. This policy seemed less immoral than the European's taking up concessions in China. It was not opposed by European powers and was even agreed to by the Qing, the then ruling Chinese government.

In the 1980's, when major countries in the world were fighting for the global commodity market, Japan chose the strategy of overseas capital expansion. It purchased farms in the US to raise cattle and exported beef to Japan, easing the conflict of trade deficit with the US through such capital expansion. For the same reason, if China invests in countries lacking capital in areas of overcapacity, then it appears more moral for it to expand its capital market interests, rather than commodity market interests.

In this current era of information, the Internet is extremely influential in all sectors:the economy, politics, security, military and culture. MRT suggests that China should take the expansion of internet interests as its strategic focus, rather than traditional areas, such as the ocean. China is already the second largest country in the world in internet technology and the biggest country in internet application. In this area, only the US has the power to compete with China. Therefore, when China expands its interests in this area, there will be fewer competitors. Besides, many small and medium-sized countries are willing to bandwagon with China's internet development, hoping to benefit from China-US internet competition. China might be able to reduce international opposition to its rise, and even win support from many countries if it expands internet-related industries. At present, the Internet is like “the Wild West” , without any international norms. The principle of preemption still applies to this area, i.e. whoever dominates this area first has the advantage of defining the rules. China's online purchasing power is an effective tool to expand the overseas internet interests of China. Compared to the expansion of interests in traditional areas, the expansion of overseas internet interests is easier for the international community to accept and would be regarded as moral. However, if China only builds domestic networks and does not expand globally, it would be a waste of China's internet capacity, a loss of a vital strategic opportunity for its rise, and increased resistance against the rise of China.

2.4 The Strategy of Rise Should Keep Pace with the Times

For a major power to rise, the process would surely involve constant changes in many factors and situations both home and abroad. That is why there is not a strategy that can guarantee a successful rise. According to MRT, only a strategy that constantly adjusts itself could adapt to the changes in the situations during the rise. Historically, successful rises have had specific reasons, but failures of one kind are usually caused by the same reason. If we fully copy the experience of past success and apply it to the present day, then failure is highly likely, because the experience is no longer suitable for the current situation. The strategy of rise must constantly be adjusted, reformed and innovated. The three main reasons that a strategy needs constant adjustment are the changes in national strength, the international situation and technological advances. A good top-level design is not about the best strategy making, but the ability of timely top-down correction of deviations, changes of outdated policies and formulation of strategies that suit new situations. The quote of Deng Xiaoping “to cross the river by feeling the stones” describes exactly the strategy of quick top-down correction, adjustment, innovation and adaptation. For the efficiency of the strategy of rise, the top-level design could offer fast top-down adjustment, timely control the damage of inappropriate strategies, and thus create new strategies to boost the probability of a successful rise.

According to MRT, political leadership is the core element of a strategy of rise as it has the authority to stipulate and adjust strategies. Strong political leadership means the capability to promote reform and innovation, namely the combination of direction, will and capability for reform. The will to reform, without capability, will not lead to a strong political leadership, let alone social reform in any real sense. If a government has the capability to reform but takes a retrogressive approach, then it is the wrong leadership. Such political leadership can only bring disaster to a country, rather than progress. Take the US government as an example. The Clinton Administration had both the will and the capability to reform, leading to the fast growth of national strength of the US. The Neo-conservative Bush Administration took a retrogressive path. His irrational policies caused damage to American national strength, turning the fiscal surplus of the Clinton era into a large-scale fiscal deficit that eventually led to the Great Recession of 2008. In comparison, the Obama administration had the will to reform but lacks the capability. So it has only postponed the recession, without increasing national strength. We can see from these cases that MRT is able to explain both successful cases when a country grows stronger or failed cases when a country becomes weaker. In this sense, MRT suffices as a scientific theoretical innovation.

China has gradually narrowed the gap with the US in comprehensive national strength since 1978. The Chinese government has provided political leadership that has been both capable and determined to carry out significant reform. Since the beginning of the 21stcentury, the social reforms in China have been much more significant than those in the US. MRT believes that “opening-up” and “reform” are the fundamental security strategies that guarantee a successful rise. By opening up, China was able to compare itself with the advanced countries of the world and identify the direction of reform. Through reform, the government corrected earlier mistakes, overcame weaknesses and improved the strategy for promoting wealth and prosperity. Innovation is the essence of reform. A rising state needs innovation on technology, economy, management and science, and more importantly, constant innovation in state governance. It is worth noting that innovation here refers to the reform in the right direction, rather than changes and reversions in a retrogressive direction.