第56章 Appendix: On What Can Be Done To Make Metaphysics

Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary]. But the acute man merely regarded the negative use arising from the moderation of extravagant claims of speculative reason, and the complete settlement of the many endless and troublesome controversies that mislead mankind. He overlooked the positive injury which results, if reason be deprived of its most important prospects, which can alone supply to the will the highest aim for all its endeavor. 4 [The term Anschauung here used means sense-perception.

It is that which is given to the senses and apprehended Immediately, as an object is seen by merely looking at it. The translation intuiition, though etymologically correct, is misleading. In the present passage the term is not used in its technical significance but means " practical experience."-Ed.] 5 [The term apodictic is borrowed by Kant from Aristotle who uses it in the sense of "certain beyond dispute." The word is derived from [Greek] (= I show) and is contrasted to dialectic propositions, i. e., such statements " admit of controversy. -- Ed.] 6 It is unavoidable that as knowledge advances, certain expressions which have become classical, after having been used since the infancy: of science, will be found inadequate and unsuitable, and a newer and more appropriate application of the terms will give rise to confusion. [This is the case with the term " analytical."] The analytical method, so far as it is opposed to the synthetical, is very different from that which constitutes the essence of analytical propositions: it signifies only that we start from what is sought, as if it were given, and ascend to the only conditions under which it is possible. In this method we often use nothing but synthetical propositions, as in mathematical analysis, and it were better to term it the regressive method, in contradistinction to the synthetic or progressive. A principal part of Logic too is distinguished by the name of Analytics, which here signifies the logic of truth in contrast to Dialectics, without considering whether the cognitions belonging to it are analytical or synthetical. 7 [This whole paragraph (Sect. 9) will be better understood when compared with Remark I., following this section. - Ed.] 8 [Empirical judgments (emfiirische Urtheile) are either mere statements of fact, viz.. records of a perception, or statements of a natural law, implying a causal connection between two facts. The former Kant calls" judgments of perception" (Wahrnehmungsurtheile), the latter "judgments of experience " (Erfahrungsurtheile).-Ed.] 9 I freely grant that these examples do not represent such judgments of perception as ever could become judgments of experience, even though a concept of the understanding were superadded, because they refer merely to feeling, which everybody knows to be merely subjective, and which of course can never be attributed to the object, and consequently never become objective. I only wished to give here an example of a judgment that is merely subjectively valid, containing no ground for universal validity, and thereby for a relation to the object. An example of the judgments of perception, which become judgments of experience by superadded concepts of the understanding, will be given in the next note. 10 As an easier example, we may take the following: " When the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm." This judgment, however often I and others may have perceived it, is a mere judgment of perception, and contains no necessity; perceptions are only usually conjoined in this manner.

But if I say, "The sun warms the stone," I add to the perception a concept of the understanding, viz., that of cause, which connects with the concept of sunshine that of heat as a necessary consequence, and the synthetical judgment becomes of necessity universally valid, viz., objective, and is converted from a perception into experience. 11 This name seems preferable to the term particularia, which is used for these judgments in logic. For the latter implies the idea that they are not universal. But when I start from unity (in single judgments) and so proceed to universality, I must not [even indirectly and negatively] imply any reference to universality. I think plurality merely without universality, and not the exception from universality. This is necessary, if logical considerations shall form the basis of the pure concepts of the understanding.

However, there is no need of making changes in logic. 12 But how does this proposition, 11 that judgments of experience contain necessity in the synthesis of perceptions," agree with my statement so often before inculcated, that "experience as cognition a posteriori can afford contingent judgments only? "When I say that experience teaches me something, I mean only the perception that lies in experience,- for example, that heat always follows the shining of the sun on a stone; consequently the proposition of experience is always so far accidental. That this heat necessarily follows the shining of the sun is contained indeed in the judgment of experience (by means of the concept of cause), yet is a fact not learned by experience; for conversely, experience is first of all generated by this addition of the concept of the understanding (of cause) to perception.

How perception attains this addition may be seen by referring in the Critique itself to the section on the Transcendental faculty of Judgment Lviz-, in the first edition, Vex dem Schematismxs der Taxes Verstandsbegrirel. 13 [Kant uses the term physiological in its etymological meaning as "pertaining to the science of physics," i.e., nature in general, not as we use the term now as "pertaining to the functions of the living body."