策略互补与不完全信息下的动态博弈问题研究

Chapter 5 Conclusions

4.7 Appendix

4.6 Conclusions

4.5 An Empirical Study: Miss Korea Pageant

4.4 Equilibrium Dynamics

4.3 Equilibrium

4.2 The Model

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 The Informational Role of Winner's Actions in a Repeated Beauty Contest Game(1)

3.7 Appendix: Proofs

3.6 Concluding Remarks

3.5 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the IMF

3.4 Interventions

3.3 Equilibrium

3.2 The Model

3.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 Interventions Policies as Public Signals in A Dynamic Global Game

2.8 Appendix

2.7 Concluding Remarks

2.6 Regime Stability in Dynamic Settings

2.5 Two-Stage Games

2.4 Comparative Statics

2.3 Equilibrium

2.2 The Static Model

2.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 A Regime Change Model with Speculators and Stakeholders

Chapter 1 Introduction

List of Tables

List of Figures

Acknowledgments

献言

Preface

作者简介

版权页

封面

封面

版权页

作者简介

Preface

献言

Acknowledgments

List of Figures

List of Tables

Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter 2 A Regime Change Model with Speculators and Stakeholders

2.1 Introduction

2.2 The Static Model

2.3 Equilibrium

2.4 Comparative Statics

2.5 Two-Stage Games

2.6 Regime Stability in Dynamic Settings

2.7 Concluding Remarks

2.8 Appendix

Chapter 3 Interventions Policies as Public Signals in A Dynamic Global Game

3.1 Introduction

3.2 The Model

3.3 Equilibrium

3.4 Interventions

3.5 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the IMF

3.6 Concluding Remarks

3.7 Appendix: Proofs

Chapter 4 The Informational Role of Winner's Actions in a Repeated Beauty Contest Game(1)

4.1 Introduction

4.2 The Model

4.3 Equilibrium

4.4 Equilibrium Dynamics

4.5 An Empirical Study: Miss Korea Pageant

4.6 Conclusions

4.7 Appendix

Chapter 5 Conclusions